Direct consequences of the French referendum were resignation of Jean-Pierre Raffaren’s government and decrease of euro’s rate (euro/dollar rate has decreased to 2 cents and now a euro equals 1.23 dollars). Also there are deeper and long-term tendencies conditioned with European population’s protest against further enlargement of Europe.
The result of the French referendum will create a crisis situation in the EU in general, notwithstanding the process of ratification of the project of the Constitution has to be continued in other countries of the EU, as EU government says. To enforce the EU Constitution, the present project has to get approval of all 25 member-states of the EU. Already 9 states have supported it: Austria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
Having said “no” to the European Constitution, Europeans protest mainly against further enlargement of the EU and decrease of the role of national sovereignty. Decision of the French was, in many respects, conditioned with fears that the European Constitution would undermine welfare of the country, give too much powers to EU bodies and lead to unemployment growth in France, because it creates conditions for transfer of main productions to Eastern European countries, where payment rates are much lower, and also increases competition at national labour market at the expense of flow of qualified but less exacting labour force from new member-states of the EU.
The Dutch, having rejected the EU Constitution after the French, said in preliminary opinion polls that, besides unwillingness to share sovereignty and to be a donor for poorer newcomers of the EU, they fear priority of the EU common law over national legislation, which pressure can lead to prohibition of marijuana, abortions, and euthanasia, worsening of situation with sexual minorities.
Nevertheless, the EU government has already claimed that the processes of EU Constitution’s ratification and EU enlargement are not connected with each other. And though, in many respects, such claims are caused with confusion of Brussels officials because of the failure of the large-scale project, it is highly probable that the EU will be saving its reputation at expense of further expansion.
As it is known, for the last year Russian foreign policy strategists are seriously preoccupied with the issue of further enlargement of the EU in post-Soviet space. New post-Soviet “democracies”, where recently the scenario of change of elites on the principle of “colour revolutions” was realized under EU participation, made future European integration basis of their foreign and, in many respects, domestic policy. Possibility of joining the EU became a “trump” in their relations with Russia.
Nevertheless, under present conditions, it is not certain whether EU enlargement with respect to the Ukraine and Georgia will take place, in case of which Russia would lose possibility of influence on these countries. The Ukrainian government is still full of optimism, even if it is just a bluff. To all appearance, Russia will have to listen Kiev’s arguments more than once.
Notwithstanding the EU has to completely focuse on solution of domestic problems, the situation is ambiguous. Moscow should not rely very much on EU reorientation from foreign to domestic issues. The EU has acted well-organized irrespective of internal “turbulences”. So, last year, at the moment of EU enlargement, the Constitution was not agreed, and the EU actively struggled with Russia at the Ukrainian elections.
Moreover, it is not excluded that the EU experiencing internal problems will try to solve them at the expense of strengthening of foreign positions, including in post-Soviet space. Notwithstanding the issue of enlargement is not actual at present, neither the EU nor pro-European post-Soviet states will refuse using contradictions in struggle with Russia, hinting on possibility of their further integration.
General weakening of Russia’s positions in the CIS led to decrease of Moscow’s authority in the international community. While Moscow, especially forced elite group in President Vladimir Putin’s surroundings, aimed at restoration of Russia’s leading role in the strategic region, often it does not have sufficient resources for it.
Competition with the West for influence on post-Soviet space and strongly pronounced anti-Russian orientation of majority of post-Soviet elites are important factors preventing from achievement of aim. But as Russia has not really strong positions, it has to demonstrate influence and activization of integration processes within the CIS.
In particular, during last week several meetings that had to show unity of the Commonwealth took place. Accidentally these meetings coincided with European internal crisis, when many observers made it clear that further enlargement of the EU is under question. For Moscow, potential possibility of entry of former Soviet republics such as Georgia and the Ukraine to the EU is extremely painful. Under these conditions, Moscow should remind that it is a leading state in the CIS and other organization within it.
As a result, Moscow has occupied with integration policy in all directions: meetings of the Council of head of governments of CIS countries in Tbilisi and the Council of Foreign Ministers of member-states of the ShOC were held simultaneously. The very fact of efforts for rapprochement is interesting in these meetings. Agenda traditionally did not conclude an intrigue and, in principle, was not informative.
And though Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev demonstratively refuses possibility of development of oil and gas cooperation bypassing Russia, in the light of recent agreement of the Kazakh government to join pro-American project Baku-Tbilisi-Jeikhan, Russia cannot ignore Yushchenko’s initiative. Yushchenko’s meeting with Moldovian President Vladimir Voronin on issues of Pridnestrovye settlement is also evidence of anti-Russian activity of the Ukrainian President. Kiev’s evident attempts to exclude Russia from negotiation process cannot but worry Moscow.
Thus, Kiev still is interested only in free trade zone within the CES. Moreover, as negotiations of Yushchenko and Nazarbaev showed, to all appearance, Kiev counts to blunt Moscow’s vigilance through introduction of principles of free trade zone, which as such is not profitable for Moscow because it means import to Russia of uncontrolled quantity of goods of unknown origin going as a transit through the Ukraine.
At the same time, efforts of pro-Western actors in post-Soviet space on decrease of Russian influence in the region are not always successful. Yushchenko’s visit to Astana cannot be regarded as especially efficient. Agreements in oil field were not signed, Nazarbaev publicly pointed to close oil and gas ties between Kazakhstan and Russia, and two years before this he supported Lukashenko’s initiative on exclusion of Kiev from the CES.
