June 15, Vladimir Putin speaks at the XI World Economy Forum in St. Petersburg.
One of the main issues of the modern policy for Vladimir Putin is the liberal-conservative ideology. If the President believes in the success of the proposed model of country’s development, there is a chance to carry out the liberal-conservative synthesis of the state policy. If the President’s speeches are only an attempt to maintain the balance between the elites by giving certain benefits to each of the groupings, the situation will not likely change in the nearest future, and the liberal conservatism will remain a mere rhetoric. There is no specific answer to this question at the time. It is possible that the last Address was the most organic for Vladimir Putin, which is proved by the fact that the President practically did not deviate from the initial text. This allows one to assume that the liberal-conservative ideology is close to the Head of State.
Vladimir Putin during his entire presidency was trying to maintain the system of the mid-elite balance that had to become the platform for his personal power. A large number of resources was used for this, some important steps were undertaken, some of which led to a higher conflict between the elites. Vladimir Putin tried not to make a choice in the favor of one of the elites. At that, almost all the groupings stayed in the political field, and the ‘new’ elite began to split into small parts, which seriously misbalanced the political system.
The attempt to establish the balance of elites in the Presidential Administration explains the appointment of the two deputy chiefs of the Presidential Administration headed by the ‘jurist’ Dmitry Medvedev – a siloviki members Igor Sechin and an ‘old Moscow’ member Vladislav Surkov. This escalated the competition and left other influential players of the groupings unsatisfied with their positions. Thus, President Assistant, a siloviki member Viktor Ivanov, who aspired for the PA Deputy Chief along with Igor Sechin, began to form his own sub-group inside the siloviki grouping.
The administrative reform in the government was also carried out under the slogan of the elite balance’ preservation, which also did not favor higher efficiency and reduced conflict. Since Putin has not yet showed the desire to abandon the system of the unstable elites’ balance, it is possible to assume that the recent ‘liberal’ speeches of the President were nothing more by a rhetoric aimed at the implementation of the former policy.
While the main part of the elite does not care about its image, Vladimir Putin cannot afford such a privilege for himself. The rating is one of the main elements of his personal power. Putin’s circle uses his rating to realize its interests without the significant increase of the social protest. Vladimir Putin can practically influence on the processes in the country since he bares the credibility to the power. Should the President’s rating drop dramatically, the political elite will have to carry out the change of power’ projects before 2008, or the possibility of the revolutionary scenarios will increase.
The important factor is that it is psychologically important for Vladimir Putin to feel the support from the bigger part of the population at his initiatives. The acting president largely arrived at the power thank to the lucky concourse of circumstances. Since the very start, Vladimir Putin has certain psychological problems related to his position in the president seat. In these conditions, one of the important elements of the adaptation and further presence at the power for Vladimir Putin was the wide support from the population. The situation is worsened by the fact that there are technologists in Putin’s circle that maintain their positional survival at the expense of the rating’ support. They convince the President that his rating’ fall will have a negative affect on his position in the political system.
The fear for the rating that is substantiated by the objective factors of the credibility level drop force Putin to devote plenty of attention to the image issues. From this point, the celebrations of the 60th Anniversary of the Great Victory were a missed chance, as Putin failed to carry out the inside-Russia part of the holiday. That is why it was decided to hold celebrations on behalf of the Day of Russia on June 12 more effective for the rating.
Besides the main project of the youth movement establishment, several others were launched as well. The most successful of them is Young Russia, the members of which participated in the concert on Vasilyevsky Spusk along with Nashi and stood on the same stage with Vladimir Putin. It is possible that the establishment of Young Russia was also carried out by the technologists of Vladislav Surkov’s team. There are some other youth movements’ projects that are launched with a certain goal with complex ideological messages compared to Nashi. Such include VAL (General Alter-globalist League).
June 15, Vladimir Yakunin is assigned Russian Railways CEO.
The major resource of Vladimir Yakunin is the old acquaintance with Vladimir Putin. They worked together in St. Petersburg. Besides, Vladimir Yakunin belongs to the team of Yuri Kovalchuk. In the early 90s Yakunin co-owned Stream corporation with Kovalchuk. The company exported color metals in exchange for food by the arrangement with the Exterior Office of St. Petersburg’s City Hall that was headed by Putin at the time. Further, Vladimir Yakunin entered the Center of Strategic Projects North-West, which was headed by Kovalchuk. In this office Yakunin worked out the mechanisms of cooperation with many of the acting central political and economic players (Andrei Fursenko, Alexander Rumyantsev, Yuri Lvov, Vladimir Smirnov). Yakunin is also acquainted with the acting Transport Minister Igor Levitin through Kovalchuk (the minister was the member of Russia Bank board, the bank is founded by Yuri Kovalchuk, Andrei and Alexander Fursenko, and Vladimir Yakunin). Thus, it is possible to say that he has a powerful positional potential.
The decisive point of Yakunin’s appointment as RR CEO was that the siloviki did not get the control over Gazprom. After the confirmation of the controlling stake of Gazprom’ transmission to the state, the siloviki began to lobby the post of RR CEO as the smart-money. Vladimir Putin had to agree to that. Especially that Yakunin had a wide experience of work with Mikhail Fradkov, who did not object to replace Fadeev with him at any time. Besides, Cabinet Chief Fradkov is forced to maintain warm relations with Transport Minister Igor Levitin because Premier’s son is working in the transport sphere. As a result, only several players were against Fadeev’s retirement, including Herman Gref. However, their lobby resource was not enough to secure Fadeev, especially that the siloviki had a powerful argument – the age of RR CEO. Fadeev is 68 and this fact was actively used by the siloviki elite to convince Putin of the need to oust him.
