At the background of the weak organization of the CIS, which inefficiency was admitted by most of its leaders, economic cooperation is provided by such organizations as EurAzEs and CES (Common Economic Space), and military – by ODKB and SHOS. The series of meetings of the Interstate Council of EurAzEs and session of the Collective Security Council of the ODKB-countries as well as creation of the high-rank group on the CES formation and session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Allied State of Russia and Belarus have completely in-built into the current tendency of creating apparent integration against rather stagnant processes.
ODKB session was dedicated above all to the problems of terrorism and narco-traffic. Besides, they discussed a plan of the coalition military construction and the program of military-technical cooperation for ODKB till 2010. In particular, it is a question of an agreement on cooperation of the frontier departments of the EurAzEs-states in crisis case at the frontiers as well as creation of the united military group of the Central-Asian region.
At the EurAzEs summit they discussed a wide range of problems starting from plastic cards for payments and transit carrying, custom procedures facilitating to entering into WTO and investing funds into the projects of the countries-participants. In political terms, current EurAzEs-summit became nothing but a response to the recent initiative of the alternative alliance at the post-soviet space against Russian interests – GUUAM.
Meanwhile, “color revolutions” in Ukraine and partly in Kyrghyzstan put under a question the very possibility of further cooperation: Ukraine is a member of CES and Kyrghyzstan - of EurAzEs, ODKB and SHOS. On the whole, home situation in both “post-revolutionary” republics is detracting their attention from integration processes under the aegis of Russia.
Energy agenda is fundamental for development and strengthening of political dialogue with many foreign policy partners of Russia. The talk about energy cooperation often helps to make positions closer or to bypass unpleasant issues. It is not accidental that during visit of Norwegian Prime Minister Hiel Magne Bunnevik the issue of oil extraction was at the top of the agenda.
One of the results of the meeting was signing of frame agreement at the state level between Russian “Gazprom” and Norwegian firms “Statoil” and “Hydro” on mutual understanding in the field of hydrocarbons development. The document suggests carrying out of joint work on searching for potential hydrocarbon deposits in Arctic, working out of technologies of development of deposits of Arctic shelf, research on influence of oil and gas extraction on socio-economic development of near regions and environment.
According to Bunnevik, the memorandum gives opportunities to Norwegian companies to participate in development of Shtokman deposit in Barents Sea, licenses on which development Russian “Gazprom” has, and invites Russian companies to participate in development of Norwegian shelf. Besides, during visit of the Norwegian Prime Minister the parties signed bilateral protocol on Russia’s entry into the WTO, which approached Russian government to the cherished political aim of joining the international “trade club”.
Economic scandal related to refusal of Russian “Eurazholding” from purchase of Georgian company “Chiaturmarganets” and cascade of electric power stations of VartsikheHESP has a serious political ground. The question is that the Russian company won the competition on purchase of “Chiaturmarganets” in January this year. According to Georgian opposition represented by the “New Rights” and Conservatives, former Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania, who died two weeks later under tragic circumstances, controlled the deal.
After Zhvania’s death Georgian authorities started putting very tough demands to “Eurazholding”, so the Russian company sacrificed 20 million dollars already paid as security. To all appearance, there is the truth in accusations put by the opposition, while Georgian officials explain the decision of “Eurazholding” with internal problems of the company.
Meanwhile, refusal of “Eurazholding” from buying Georgian enterprises can damage the Georgian budget, as 132 million dollars have been already included in its revenues. Moreover, Tbilisi worries about “chain reaction” of investors, moreover, there are prerequisites for it. So, Swiss company “Bazel” refused buying Krtsanis governmental residence, for which it had been going to pay 15 million dollars.
At the same time, Tbilisi does not exclude possibility of buying of these objects by Ukrainian “Interpipe”, which lost to “Eurazholding” (most likely, because of political reasons, as head of “Interpipe” Viktor Pinchuk belongs to Dnepropetrovsk clan, which is loyal to former elite, and he is ex-President Leonid Kuchma’s son-in-law).
Meanwhile, notwithstanding the “Eurazholding” showed ambiguity of investment climate of Georgia at a background of powerful internal perturbations, Moscow still possesses political means of influence on the situation, which the very unrecognized republics regularly give.
So, Abkhazian President Sergey Bagapsh pronounced eloquent pro-Russian statements claiming Moscow main strategic ally of Sukhumi and emphasizing invariability of the policy on increase of welfare of society and building independent, democratic state oriented to Russia.
Besides, Bagapsh spoke in favour of maintenance of presence of Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia and against replacement of Russian peacemaking contingent with other forces. In opinion of the Abkhazian leaders, Russian peacemaking forces have to be in Abkhazia until complete settlement of Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.
Abkhazia’s motives are quite clear. Russia is in fact the only guarantor against Tbilisi’s claims for territorial integrity at the expense of joining Abkhazia and South Osetia. Such support is also favourable for Moscow: after actual loss related to beginning of withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia, the question on the search of means of influence on pro-Western Tbilisi is acute enough.
Existing problems in strained relations with Baltic countries again became evident during the process of ratification of a treaty on the state border of Estonia. Political and territorial aspect of the problem was diluted with ideological notes, when Estonian parliamentarians decided to add an obligatory point on recognition of “illegal Soviet occupation from 1940 to 1991” to preamble of a law on ratification of the treaty.
Russia, as usual, reacted painfully and toughly at attempts to “rewrite history”, moreover, such interpretation will face negative reaction of Russian society. The RF Foreign Ministry categorically claimed that Russia refused ratification of the border treaty with Estonia. Thus, Russian-Estonian peace having reigned after signing of a treaty with Estonia on land and sea border on May 18 was again broken.
The latent problem Estonia would like to demonstrate is belonging of Pechora krai, which, according to Tartus peace treaty, was given to Estonia. In the krai small in numbers setu people live being famous as Pskov chud’. In 1944 when Pskov region was formed, a part of Pechora krai became its part.
Now Estonian parliamentarians basing on opinion of Estonian setu elders claim that aiming at preservation of the area of life of this ancient people the border should be returned to the place it took in 1920. For Russians, Estonians’ care of preservation of disappearing people can turn into loss of a part of Pskov region. Besides, Estonia can claim for a part of Leningrad region.
Situation with signing of a treaty on border with Latvia can include similar difficulties. The issue on belonging of former Abrensk uyezd (now Pytalovsky district of Pskov region) remains main obstacle for its conclusion, as a result of which the border treaty has not been signed yet.
