Chinese leader Khu Tszintao’s visit to Russia confirmed intentions of Russia. Joint Declaration on international order in the 21st century can be regarded as a symbol. In the Declaration Russia and China claimed inadmissibility of pretences for monopoly in the world affairs, division of states into leading and submitted ones, imposing models of development, double standards, meaning, first of all, the USA.
Program of works on development of interaction was formulated in the plan of action on realization of statements of Russian-Chinese Treaty on good neighborhood, friendship and cooperation for 2005-2008, which was asserted by Vladimir Putin and Khu Tszintao during recent Russian-Chinese summit in October 2004 in Beijing.
Special place in a program of Khu Tszintao’s visit was given to the issues on strengthening of cooperation among regions of the two countries. Moscow’s course on social-economic development of Siberia and the Far East and Beijing’s rapid development of western and modernization of northeastern provinces objectively form prerequisites for mutual profitable interregional ties, especially neighbor regions. On the other hand, there are fears on total Chinization of Russian regions contiguous to china. For several decades demographic explosion in China changed and is changing correlation of demographic masses along Russian southern border. Taking into consideration growing economic and demographic strength of China, Russian government worries about illegal migration of its citizens to Russia’s regions bordering with China.
Main military strategists hint on potential military threat of China, though the RF General Headquarter of Armed Forces classifies it as “distant ones”. Meanwhile, Beijing and Moscow prefer to officially characterize their relations as “strategic partnership”. The Year of Russia in China (2006) and the Year of China in Russia (2007) have to be a symbol of close ties of these two countries.
The idea of strategic partnership within the framework of the global triangle Moscow-Deli-Beijing was proposed by ex-Prime Minister Eugeny Primakov at the end of 90’s last century in period of RF President Boris Yeltsin’s government. This ideology was developed in BRIC conception proposed by American researchers about a year and a half ago.
Russian government regards such alliance as a base for formation of an “arc of stability” in Asia. The union with Beijing is especially actual at a background of instable situation in post-Soviet space and hints on formation of “counterrevolutionary” union on example of Uzbekistan. As it is known, China, together with Russia, supported Karimov’s actions during suppression of Andizhan rebellion in May this year.
Within the framework of cooperation of Moscow and Beijing in Central Asia, Russian government, to all appearance, counts to give a symmetrical response to US attempts to get their own belt of security of energy resources and ways of their transportation from the region of the former USSR (first of all, though Baku-Tbilisi-Jeikhan pipeline), forming alternative energy belt connecting Russia, Uzbekistan, and China.
Though during visit of the Chinese leader the sides worked out a relatively consolidated “counterrevolutionary” position, which, to all appearance, will be sounded on July 5-6 at the summit of ShOC, among member of which are Russia, Uzbekistan, and China, Moscow’s hopes on formation of new Asian triangle Moscow-Tashkent-Beijing can fail.
In Central Asia Beijing is most likely Moscow’s competitor rather than an ally, and it is clear that it considers the situation with international isolation of Tashkent as a means to spread its sphere of influence on it. Its plans on military presence in Kyrghyzstan are evidence of Beijing’s real intentions to Central Asia.
Competition between Russian and West for influence in the CIS approaches to the critical point. Trend of “color revolutions” that has recently strengthened in the CIS is equally frightening the authorities of the countries that are targets for the western technologies as well as Moscow that is afraid, on the one hand, of weakening of its influence at the CIS-space and, on the other hand, sees danger in these events for its own domestic security.
The visit of the president of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov into Moscow is not without a reason. Uzbekistan along with Belarus is one of the possible targets for the next “color revolution”. Though, in contrast to Minsk, Washington did not declare its “revolutionary” plans officially, series of its recent steps, especially within the last month, directly pointed at this.
Until now the pro-Uzbeks position of Moscow was made public by the heads of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense. Sergey Lavrov and Sergey Ivanov well-defined expressed their support to the Uzbeks authority that characterized the events in Andizhan as anti-governmental armed revolt prepared by the western terrorist centers.
Moscow persists upon connection of the Islamists to the events in Andizhan and completely justifies actions of the Uzbeks authority appealing the West no to get involved into the internal affairs of Uzbekistan. It is remarkable that Moscow has not many real resources for support. Support to Karimov boils down to the same actions as for the previously lost presidential candidate in Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich and deposed ex-president of Kyrghyzstan Askar Akaev.
At the critical moment the Russian authorities receive the leaders of the republics that are impeded by the “revolutionary” threat or visit them and do them silent or (as for Yanukovich) active support. However, after Yanukovich’s loss the Kremlin got much more reserved in the expression of its relation to the “problem” heads of the states, though the very fact of the Karimov’s visit is eloquently speaking for itself.
The same support Tashkent got from Beijing where Islam Karimov paid a visit after bloodshed in Andizhan that shows a potential opportunity of forming strategy Asian triangle Moscow-Beijing-Tashkent. Thus, actual isolation of Tashkent from the West facilitates gradual formation of its pro-Russian and pro-Chinese orientation. The “counter-revolutionary” axis creation is confirmed by the fact that, apart from preparing return visit of the Chinese leader into Uzbekistan, in the nearest future it will be visited by the Belarussian president Alexander Lukashenko.
As concerns China, it is not less then Russia interested in prevention pro-western forces from coming to power in the Central Asia since it justly considers these events as a part of American strategy on surrounding China by the non-friendly states that are able to offer the USA their territories for military bases at “far avenues of approaches” to the main American antagonist.
There is no strong oppositional leader in Uzbekistan with whom Russia can establish relations. However, the USA, destabilizing situation in Uzbekistan, contacted more actively with Uzbek opposition. Karimov’s fears on western threat are not groundless. Last week leader of “Erk” Mukhammad Salikh visited Washington. He, in fact, heads political opposition in Uzbekistan. Salikh was accused of anti-constitutional actions and correspondently sentenced to 15 years of prison (he lives in emigration).
Washington’s decision on considerable decrease of material help to Tashkent in connection with insufficient development of democracy in the country is also evidence of preparation for “revolutionary” scenario.
Besides political price, to all appearance, Tashkent also will have to make economic concessions, in particular, on the issue of paying off Uzbek debt of Russia, assessed by Moscow at 647 million dollars. Russia wants to get the most paying enterprises of oil and gas sphere of Uzbekistan. It should be mentioned that Uzbekistan has gas stores almost equal to Turkmen ones, and it is not excluded that Russia can prefer cooperation with Tashkent in this sphere. Besides, Moscow counts on the privilege regime of usage of the center of quantum-optical observation of space sputniks “Maydanak”, which is situated on the territory of Uzbekistan.
Lack of consensus on the CES problem is not the only problem of Moscow relations with Kiev. Gas battles between the two countries that have obviously political background are ongoing. As it is known, about two weeks ago Moscow accused Kiev in loss of 7.8 bln.of gas from underground gas stocks (UGS) of Ukraine and demanded to pay for gas post factum.
Last week the Gazprom’s executives declared to the Ukrainian colleagues that it accounts lost gas as already delivered in Ukraine as payment for transit that disavowed both previous demands of monetary compensation and the very idea of changing to the monetary but not exchange way of payment for transit. Thus, instead of 23 bln.c.m. of gas Ukraine will get from Gazprom as transit payment only 15.2 bln.c.m. At that, the Ukrainian side made rather ambiguous declaration that in this case Kiev will have to execute non-sanctioned withdrawal of gas from the transit pipelines.
It is not excluded that the absurd replicas only hide preparation of a new scheme of gas cooperation with new “orange” power. As it is known from the history of the Russian-Ukrainian relations (scheme of gas re-selling into Europe with participation of the government of Timoshenko and Chernomyrdin, when imitation of gas-loss gave opportunity to share the profit between certain Ukrainian and Russian figures), gas from UGS may get lost only “under convoy” of the supplier.
Most likely, scandal with the lost gas is associated with search for new forms of gas “cooperation”. Gazprom seems to in lookout for acceptable forms of gas dialogue with the “orange” authorities in order not to “end up loosing” and public clashes symbolize not completely coordinated terms of a secret gas deal to be concluded.
Within the frames of diversification of the Russian foreign policy the Russian ministry of foreign affairs Sergey Lavrov visited Yemen that has a serious political and economic significance for Moscow. Major goal of the visit was participation as a guest in the conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of the countries-members of the Organization of Islam Conference (OIC) that unites 57 Muslim states.
As it is known, Moscow declared its will to join the OIC in august 2003 at its summit in Malaysia by the words of the Russian president Vladimir Putin. And though Russia is unlikely to become a valid member (entry qualification is not less then 50% of the Muslims in the country), Moscow expects to get some benefits from future status of OIC’s observer.
In political terms, acquiring of this status for Moscow means, above all, the chance to change view of the international Muslim society at the problem of Chechnya and thus closing in to its solution. Besides, Moscow wills to demonstrate that it strives to struggle against Islamic extremism not only together with the West but with the leaders of Muslim world as well.
Besides, Moscow recons through closing in with the OIC countries to attract in Russia the finance investment and, it is not excluded, to work out joint strategy of an alternative to the USA administration of the world oil prices. Interest of the Arab countries to Russia is stipulated by its status of a constant member in the Security Council UN as well. In the light of discussion the problem of broadening Security Council UN, significant members of OIC, for instance, Egypt seem to be expecting Russian support in this matter.
As concerns bilateral relations of Russia and Yemen, at the negotiations they primarily discussed deliveries of defense technology, in particular, antitank missile complex, antiaircraft missile emplacements and armored vehicles. Russia sees in this cooperation not only economic benefit but, above all, a means of pressure upon the USA that do not conceal their discontent because of military closing in of Russia and Yemen.
