The trend of polarization of the Russian elite suggesting different models of behavior in the crisis situation finally shaped last week. Some part of the elite, they can be conditionally called liberal reformers, stand for fundamental reconstruction of the political system; others, the conservators, are pushing forward the idea of Russia’s autarchy as an extreme measure with the objective to maximally isolate the country from consequences of the global crisis.
In the context of this confrontation the perception of 2020 Strategy and forums devoted to it has changed. Currently not only the letter of the document is important, which will be revised not once in the light of the crisis, but rather its spirit envisaging gradual modernization of the political system without its fundamental destruction like in the 1990s. Since confrontation of the two groups is likely to finish with a compromise, the struggle for control over the discourse of the modernization project is being brought into the foreground. The winner will claim authorship of the Russian political system in the second decade of the 21st century.
However, the current system is enough durable so far, which was demonstrated by the regional elections whose results were drawn last week. United Russia managed to preserve dominant positions, although they weakened in a number of regions in favor of parliamentary minorities. This, however, does not pose any threat to the political system on the whole. Thus, if there is no new serious decline in social and economic parameters, United Russia will manage to retain its domination in the crisis period. The municipal election results were alarming for the party of power as it failed in some cases to ensure simple majority or mayor posts. Moreover, conflicts of local clans surfaced and UR failed to settle or at least conceal them.
Dmitry Medvedev attends a meeting of the board of the prosecutor general’s office
Dmitry Medvedev, Yury Chaika, Alexander Bastrykin
Ratio of authority of investigation committee and prosecutor general’s office will remain unchanged on the whole
Vladimir Putin meets with United Russia’s top figures
Vladimir Putin
PM will become less optimistic in evaluating prospects of overcoming the crisis
Vladimir Putin says settling social problems of the society is a priority amid the crisis
Vladimir Putin
Authorities will be implementing the medium-term (2-3 years) anti-crisis strategy
Vyacheslav Volodin is elected head of the state construction department at MSU
This post may become an alternate airfield for Volodin in case of dismissal
Deputy PM Sergey Ivanov says Russia will completely renew its strategic nuclear forces by 2020
The crisis will negatively influence the current insufficient modernization of the forces
Information is posted that the airborne forces will be reduced as a result of military reforms
Anatoly Serdyukov
This will decrease the Russian armed forces’ combat capacity and provoke additional discontent among officers
Dmitry Medvedev submits bills on parties that collect 5% to 7% of the vote and on reducing the number of signatures necessary to participate in elections, to State Duma
Dmitry Medvedev
The bills will be passed without considerable changes in the shortest time possible
Lawyer Igor Trunov is elected head of the Moscow branch of Pravoe Delo
Trunov is unlikely to be a competent manager
Plenum of the Central Committee of the communist party
Gennady Zyuganov
Zyuganov will continue mopping up the area around him
Regulations on Rosalcohol are approved
Rosalcohol
Agriculture and finance ministries, federal tax and tariff services
Rosalcohol will not face serious resistance in gaining control over the market
Administrative conflicts and public politics stirred up by the crisis were balanced last week. President Dmitry Medvedev further developed the idea of Supreme Arbitration Court chair Anton Ivanov about the necessity to modernize Russian laws. It seems the prosecutor general’s office will have a considerable role in this project – it is carrying out anti-corruption examination of bills and has already pointed out that at least 10,000 of them contain corruption motives. Thus, the prospects of cardinal modernization of Russian laws (however, on the municipal level mainly) are shaping clearer. It should be noted that the president supported the initiatives of Yury Chaika’s administrative rival, investigation committee head Alexander Bastrykin, pointing to the necessity to work with such an important institution as the jury.
Last week the head of state introduced two last bills out of the so-called 10 planks voiced in his 2008 Address. Thus, his plans to partially liberalize the Russian political system are acquiring a more and more complete shape despite the criticism by some opposition members, who believe this is imitation. These processes are taking place amid another wave of rumors about soon breakup of the ruling tandem and dismissal of Vladimir Putin. Such rumors are likely to be due to the anniversary of Dmitry Medvedev’s election, which will gradually turn into the anniversary of his inauguration, which will provide ground for speculations about the tandem’s collapse in the next 2.5 months at least.
On the administrative level there was complete confusion over military reforms. According to the latest data, the airborne troops will be reduced, which contradicts the sense of the reforms aimed at increasing the number of constant combat readiness units. Confidence of the defense ministry’s top officials that the nuclear shield is enough to withstand modern military threats also causes doubts.
Last week Dmitry Medvedev sharply intensified his activities demonstrating his intention to take a more active part in anti-crisis management, including defining priorities of state support. A clear signal was sent to the functionaries regarding the necessity to be more initiative and thus take more responsibility upon themselves. The criticism was mainly aimed at governors (the policy of ‘stick’ was demonstrated early last week when four governors were dismissed) but the government was also addressed, although the president shared approaches with the PM in the sphere of protectionism in economy amid the crisis.
Dmitry Medvedev’s team also became more active noticeably, especially in its natural sphere of influence – the judicial branch of power. In particular, the higher qualification panel of judges ruled to deprive Lyudmila Maikova, head of the arbitration court of the Moscow district, of her status of judge. She and Moscow Arbitration Court chair Oleg Sviridenko are related to the clientele of the so-called siloviki. Now Supreme Arbitration Court head Anton Ivanov has a chance to build the arbitration vertical, which he has been trying to do for some years. His plans are likely to be even broader as he declared about the necessity to clear up Russia’s laws. If he succeeds, this may lead to bigger attractiveness of court trials compared to informal arbitration by law enforcement bodies, which will decrease their weight. At the same time, one should not overestimate the role of the president’s top hundred reservists, who were announced last week, in the process of strengthening of positions of Dmitry Medvedev’s team. The analysis of its composition shows it consists of representatives of different elite groups.
The staff struggle in the Cabinet remained sharp in general; it received an additional impulse after agriculture minister Alexey Gordeyev and his ‘right hand’ deputy minister Alexander Kozlov left their posts. On the whole, there are two Gordeyev’s deputies who are claiming the vacant post: one of them (Andrey Slepnev) is related to Arkady Dvorkovich’s group while the other (Nikolay Arkhipov) is likely to be a protégé of the so-called siloviki.
Dmitry Medvedev says decline in defense expenses will not affect the army’s modernization and social sphere
Under the conditions of crisis the budget sequester will be substantial and will gradually affect all budget items
The list of the President’s top hundred men is announced
Dmitry Medvedev
There will be selective appointments from this list
Alexey Gordeyev and Alexander Kozlov are nominated to governor of Voronezh and Orlov regions respectively
Candidatures will be approved without problems; Gordeyev’s team will have to leave the agriculture ministry
Just Russia deputies introduce a bill on assigning job quotas to graduates of higher educational establishments
Just Russia will keep voicing populist initiatives
Higher qualification panel of judges rules to deprive Lyudmila Maikova, head of the federal arbitration court of the Moscow district, of the status of judge
Anton Ivanov
Siloviki
Supreme Arbitration Court chair Anton Ivanov will accelerate the process of creating the arbitration vertical
Supreme Court deputy chair Alexander Karpov resigns
Vyacheslav Lebedev
Lebedev’s positions will remain stable in the near future
Valery Zorkin reelected head of the Constitutional Court
Valery Zorkin
Zorkin will retain his post in the next three years
Anastasia Rakova appointed head of the legal department of the government staff
Sergey Sobyanin
Igor Sechin
Contrary to rumors, Sobyanin will not leave the Cabinet in the near future
Justice ministry registers Pravoe Delo
Pravoe Delo will not carry out systemic activities with potential voters in the next few months
Sergey Sobyanin is elected chairman of the board of directors of First Channel
Sergey Sobyanin
Sergey Naryshkin
This change is technical and it will not result in changes in the channel’s policies
Alexey Makushkin is appointed chief of the government’s analytical center
Makushkin may lean on siloviki and Sergey Chemezov like his predecessor
Alexander Chernogorov is appointed deputy agriculture minister
The probability that Chernogorov will be promoted to minister is low
Deputy PM Alexander Zhukov commissions the interior ministry and federal tax service to organize deportation of jobless migrants
Alexander Zhukov
Zhukov will not increase his media activity and may leave his post in the next few months
Representatives of power agencies were again increasingly active last week. In particular, Investigation Committee head Alexander Bastrykin again put forward accusations against the inner circle of finance minister Alexey Kudrin. This is probably due to the beginning of another offensive at the administrative heavyweight by influential staff and political groups willing to gain control over this strategic post. The heads of General Prosecutor’s Office, interior ministry and FSB were also noticeably active on the media field. Such intensified activities are first of all attributed to the on-going crisis and decline in resources, which resulted in sharpened struggle for remaining resources. Moreover, amid the crisis the role of power agencies as an element of the state system will be growing.
The situation around another power body, the defense ministry, which is traditionally considered separate from others, was very confusing last week. After a close meeting of defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov in the State Duma it became known that the military budget would be reduced by 15%, although it is not clear what budget expenses will be revised. The army’s rearmament is likely to be sacrificed, which is unacceptable considering constant deterioration of its combat potential, especially from the technical point of view. The defense ministry and state authorities seem to realize this fact and they are planning to stake on strategic nuclear forces; yet, the situation here is also not so unambiguous. Firstly, the strategic nuclear forces are also degrading inexorably. Secondly, modern conflicts imply the use of the ground forces (such a situation may emerge on the Russian-Chinese border), but they are expected to be reduced within the framework of reforms.
The dynamics of changes on the non-power part of the political field also provides for some interesting observation. The authorities seem to have selected two parallel strategies of countering the crisis. The first strategy envisages maintenance of an acceptable level of social optimism, judging by a speech of Vladislav Surkov, first deputy head of the presidential administration, at 2020 Forum. The second is about assimilating responsible counter-elites and incorporating them into the current elite, even if it happens just symbolically like in the case of refreshing the composition of the president’s council for human rights.
The head of state’s strategic course aimed at broadening the base of his support among the population and the elite became more vivid last week. Coincidences that seemed accidental are starting to acquire a clear and consistent character. In particular, Dmitry Medvedev did not attend the congress of the Russian Association of Lawyers, despite his image of patron of the judicial corporation; however, this did not hinder election of his protégé, Pavel Krasheninnikov, co-chairperson of the association. At the same time the president made an attractive proposal to the interior ministry at a meeting of the MVD board. He declared about the necessity of the ministry’s control over the spending of state resources allocated to fight the crisis. It is interesting that a week earlier similar things were told to FSB. In his video blog the head of state declared initiatives aimed at supporting students – one of the most dynamic and mobile social groups.
There was noticeable expansion of first deputy PM Igor Shuvalov last week, who continued publicly asserting himself as the main anti-crisis manager. In particular, he declared that the list of enterprises to be rendered state assistance would be considerably enlarged and the resources would be allocated to them directly, not through VEB. This means tactical defeat of deputy PM Igor Sechin who has in fact supervised distribution of money through this bank since last autumn. Yet, government liberals headed by Shuvalov may lose on the strategic side: despite temporary slackening of crisis developments, fundamental factors point to its upcoming second round, after which members of the liberal camp in the government may become scapegoats.
It should be also noted that Igor Sechin’s allies, first of all Sergey Chemezov, continue developing their business offensive. It is often done in prejudice of representatives of old elite groups, e.g. the Family group. Last week information was posted about problems of Oleg Deripaska and Aeroflot (possible cancellation of royalties) headed by Valery Okulov, Boris Yeltsin’s son-in-law. Business groups supporting Vladimir Putin and Igor Sechin were named as possible beneficiaries.
