Representatives of power agencies were again increasingly active last week. In particular, Investigation Committee head Alexander Bastrykin again put forward accusations against the inner circle of finance minister Alexey Kudrin. This is probably due to the beginning of another offensive at the administrative heavyweight by influential staff and political groups willing to gain control over this strategic post. The heads of General Prosecutor’s Office, interior ministry and FSB were also noticeably active on the media field. Such intensified activities are first of all attributed to the on-going crisis and decline in resources, which resulted in sharpened struggle for remaining resources. Moreover, amid the crisis the role of power agencies as an element of the state system will be growing.
The situation around another power body, the defense ministry, which is traditionally considered separate from others, was very confusing last week. After a close meeting of defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov in the State Duma it became known that the military budget would be reduced by 15%, although it is not clear what budget expenses will be revised. The army’s rearmament is likely to be sacrificed, which is unacceptable considering constant deterioration of its combat potential, especially from the technical point of view. The defense ministry and state authorities seem to realize this fact and they are planning to stake on strategic nuclear forces; yet, the situation here is also not so unambiguous. Firstly, the strategic nuclear forces are also degrading inexorably. Secondly, modern conflicts imply the use of the ground forces (such a situation may emerge on the Russian-Chinese border), but they are expected to be reduced within the framework of reforms.
The dynamics of changes on the non-power part of the political field also provides for some interesting observation. The authorities seem to have selected two parallel strategies of countering the crisis. The first strategy envisages maintenance of an acceptable level of social optimism, judging by a speech of Vladislav Surkov, first deputy head of the presidential administration, at 2020 Forum. The second is about assimilating responsible counter-elites and incorporating them into the current elite, even if it happens just symbolically like in the case of refreshing the composition of the president’s council for human rights.
Representatives of power agencies were again increasingly active last week. In particular, Investigation Committee head Alexander Bastrykin again put forward accusations against the inner circle of finance minister Alexey Kudrin. This is probably due to the beginning of another offensive at the administrative heavyweight by influential staff and political groups willing to gain control over this strategic post. The heads of General Prosecutor’s Office, interior ministry and FSB were also noticeably active on the media field. Such intensified activities are first of all attributed to the on-going crisis and decline in resources, which resulted in sharpened struggle for remaining resources. Moreover, amid the crisis the role of power agencies as an element of the state system will be growing.
The situation around another power body, the defense ministry, which is traditionally considered separate from others, was very confusing last week. After a close meeting of defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov in the State Duma it became known that the military budget would be reduced by 15%, although it is not clear what budget expenses will be revised. The army’s rearmament is likely to be sacrificed, which is unacceptable considering constant deterioration of its combat potential, especially from the technical point of view. The defense ministry and state authorities seem to realize this fact and they are planning to stake on strategic nuclear forces; yet, the situation here is also not so unambiguous. Firstly, the strategic nuclear forces are also degrading inexorably. Secondly, modern conflicts imply the use of the ground forces (such a situation may emerge on the Russian-Chinese border), but they are expected to be reduced within the framework of reforms.
The dynamics of changes on the non-power part of the political field also provides for some interesting observation. The authorities seem to have selected two parallel strategies of countering the crisis. The first strategy envisages maintenance of an acceptable level of social optimism, judging by a speech of Vladislav Surkov, first deputy head of the presidential administration, at 2020 Forum. The second is about assimilating responsible counter-elites and incorporating them into the current elite, even if it happens just symbolically like in the case of refreshing the composition of the president’s council for human rights.
